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ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE SEVENTY-NINTH MEETING

Held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Monday, 3 September 1962, at 3.30 p.m.

Chairman:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI

(Poland)

PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Brazil:

Mr. J.A. de ARAUJO CASTRO
Mr. RODRIGUES RIBAS
Mr. de ALENCAR ARARIPE
Mr. J. LENGYEL

Bulgaria:

Mr. M. TARABANOV
Mr. G. GUELEV
Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV

Burma:

U MAUNG MAUNG GYI

Canada:

Mr. E.L.M. BURNS
Mr. S.F. RAE
Mr. A.E. GOTLIEB
Mr. R.M. TAIT

Czechoslovakia:

Mr. M. ZEMLA
Mr. V. TYLNER
Mr. Y. BUCEK
Mr. J. RIHA

Ethiopia:

ATO HADDIS ALAMAYEHU
ATO M. HAMID
ATO GETACHEW KEBRETH

India:

Mr. A.S. LALL
Mr. A.S. MEHTA
Mr. K. KRISHNA RAO
Mr. P.M. GEORGE

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

Italy:

Mr. F. CAVALLETTI
Mr. A. CAGIATI
Mr. C. COSTA-REGHINI
Mr. F. LUCIOLI OTTIERI

Mexico:

Mr. L. PADILLA NERVO
Mr. E. CALDERON PUIG
Miss E. AGUIRRE
Mr. D. GONZALES GOMEZ

Nigeria:

Mr. M.T. MBU
Mr. L.C.N. OBI

Poland:

Mr. M. NASZKOWSKI
Mr. M. LOBCDYCZ
Mr. T. SLOWINSKI
Mr. W. WIECZOREK

Romania:

Mr. M. MALITZA
Mr. H. FLORESCU
Mr. E. GLASER
Mr. O. NEDA

Sweden:

Mr. R. EDBERG
Mr. P. KELLIN
Mr. B. FRIEDMAN

Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics:

Mr. V.V. KUZNETSOV
Mr. A.A. ROSCHIN
Mr. P.F. SHAKHOV
Mr. B.I. POKLAD

PRESENT AT THE TABLE (cont'd)

United Arab Republic:

Mr. A.F. HASSAN
Mr. M.H. EL-ZAYYAT
Mr. A.E. ABDEL MAGUID
Mr. S. AHMED

United Kingdom:

Mr. J.B. GODBER
Sir Michael WRIGHT
Mr. D.N. BRINSON
Mr. J.M. EDES

United States of America:

Mr. A.H. DEAN
Mr. C.C. STELLE
Mr. D.E. MARK
Mr. R.A. MARTIN

Special Representative of the
Secretary-General:

Mr. C. LOUTFI

Deputy to the Special Representative
of the Secretary-General:

Mr. W. EPSTEIN

The CHAIRMAN (Poland) (translation from French): I declare open the seventy-ninth plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

Mr. DEAN (United States of America): Although negotiations for the conclusion of a sound and effective treaty prohibiting nuclear weapon tests have lately been in the forefront of our attention, we have, of course, continued at the same time to discuss the problems arising from the Soviet and United States proposals regarding general disarmament measures in the first stage. I submit that that is as it should be, because no matter how important individual issues may be for peoples everywhere -- and some of them such as a test ban treaty are of truly major significance and importance -- nevertheless the fundamental and paramount need will be to make rapid progress towards a treaty providing for general and complete disarmament under effective international control in a peaceful world. From that point of view the statements which we have heard in this Committee over the past four weeks concerning items 5 (b) and 5 (c) of document ENDC/52 have been extremely constructive in showing the strength and seriousness of the United States approach to general and complete disarmament and in exposing the appalling weaknesses and inconsistencies of the Soviet position.

It should now be clear to all that the Soviet Union's proposal for the so-called 100 per cent elimination of all nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage in order, so it claims, to end the threat of nuclear war, is a pure sham, a fraud and an illusion, which can be neither appropriately implemented in practice nor subjected to effective first stage controls. Moreover, the Soviet representative tells us that this scheme would have to be accompanied by the 100 per cent elimination of all Western foreign military bases throughout the world, even though that would create, as a glance at the map will reveal, a marked strategic imbalance in favour of the Soviet bloc whether or not there were provisions in the treaty for liquidation of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles.

Why is the Western approach reasonable and feasible?

First, it provides for a steady progression of disarmament measures from the beginning of stage I to the end of stage III towards the goals of total disarmament which are set forth clearly in the joint statement of agreed principles (ENDC/5), while at all times maintaining a realistic allocation of measures among the three distinct stages of disarmament.

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Second, stage I comprehends measures which are sensibly devised for the period when the disarmament organization is first getting under way and when control arrangements cannot, as a practical matter, be all-inclusive in scope.

Third, the path towards disarmament under the United States plan is in full harmony with the present state of international relations; there is no attempt to introduce in a brief period radical measures which are wholly out of keeping with existing political realities.

Fourth, the first-stage measures proposed by the West would halt the arms race by preventing all further development of significant new weapons, by rigidly controlling future production and by making a strong start towards a general downturn in armament levels in almost all types of weapons and armed forces, more or less across the board.

Fifth, by avoiding significant changes in the mix, or composition, of the various types of arms in the arsenals of each State during the implementation of the disarmament treaty, the Western plan both maintains the existing pattern of interrelationship of national forces, thus avoiding problems of strategic imbalance, and eliminates the need for negotiations on delicate and intensely controversial issues involved in the composition of forces.

Sixth, control machinery under the Western plan would be adequate to provide reasonable assurances against violations by any party. However, by increasing the work of the international disarmament organization and the scope of controls only gradually from the first to the third stage, undue disclosures of national military secrets, which might prejudice the security of some States -- a matter vital to the Soviet Union -- would be prevented.

The unrealistic proposals of the Soviet Union stand in vivid contrast to the realistic approach of the United States and the other Western delegations, and I think it will be worth our while to review once again the serious and deep-seated deficiencies of the Soviet plan, which can be cured only by a fundamental change of approach.

First, the net result of the Soviet first stage, if it could actually be wholly accomplished, which we do not believe, would be to create a radical readjustment both of the military positions of States and of the military interrelationships of States; to eliminate the military presence of the United States from Europe; to fragment the Western European countries into a number of small, separate armed forces which would be prohibited from any military co-operation with one another; and to

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leave Western Europe at the mercy of one overwhelmingly superior armed force in terms of conventional weapons, with unified training, equipment and command, namely, that of the Soviet Union, which from the Soviet-Polish frontier would be less than 1,000 kilometres away from the Eastern boundaries of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The same elimination of United States military presence, the same consequences in terms of a fragmentation of military forces among many countries and a destruction of mutual assistance defence arrangements would take place also in the Middle and Far East, at present protected by the CENTO, SEATO and ANZUS Treaties, as well as by other defence treaties between the United States and individual nations, such as the Philippines, Japan, Korea and nationalist China, while the Soviet Union and communist China would become the dominant military Powers in both areas. The United States, under the Soviet plan, would become an immobile prisoner within its own borders on the North American continent, unable to answer calls for help in the defence of freedom by those States whose peace and stability were being undermined from abroad.

Second, the scheme for 100 per cent elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles in one stage would pose innumerable problems of definition with regard to what was either an actual or a potential nuclear delivery vehicle and what could be nothing else but a conventional weapon.

Mr. Stelle's statement on 29 August (ENDC/PV.76) went into detail again on the manifold problems of attempting to reach agreement on any arbitrary dividing line between the two classes of weapons; and the speech of the United Kingdom representative on 31 August (ENDC/PV.77) pointed out some of the absurd positions that the Soviet delegation finds itself trying to defend whenever it attempts to put forward simplified definitions and differentiations.

It is now evident, therefore, that if all potential nuclear delivery vehicles were eliminated in the first stage that would amount to virtually complete liquidation of the great bulk of all armaments in the first stage -- which is surely an approach never contemplated either by the joint statement of agreed principles (ENDC/5) or by common sense.

I listened with great interest to the questions posed this morning by the representative of India (ENDC/PV.78, p. 32 et seq.) and I should like to study them and to answer them at a later date. However, some of those questions put by Mr. Lall imply that some Americans, like Mr. Henry Kissinger, are able to distinguish between nuclear and conventional delivery systems and that, therefore, it should not be the serious problem which I have said here, on behalf of my delegation, it would be. Let me say

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to the representative of India that we in the United States have no difficulty at all in differentiating between delivery systems specifically designed for nuclear weapons and those not so designed. The problem, however, is quite changed when raised in the context of the Soviet proposal to eliminate in the first stage all nuclear weapon-delivery vehicles capable of delivering nuclear weapons while the nuclear warheads themselves would remain available.

We all know that with part of the tests the Soviet Union carried out last year it achieved very important weight-yield results, and in all probability the Soviet Union is again trying to improve the weight-yield formula -- that is, reducing the weight of the weapon while maintaining its yield. If the Soviet Union is as successful with the tests it is now carrying out as it was last autumn it will be quite possible to carry nuclear weapons on vehicles not specifically designed for the purpose. I therefore submit that when we get down to it the Soviet proposal to destroy everything capable of carrying a nuclear weapon presents quite a difficult problem. We have to concern ourselves not only with vehicles designed to deliver nuclear weapons but also with all vehicles which might readily be made capable of delivering nuclear weapons, which is quite a different thing. That is not the issue with which Mr. Henry Kissinger was dealing in the July number of Foreign Affairs, nor was it anticipated in paragraph 3(c) of the joint statement of agreed principles (ENDC/5, p.2). It is posed initially only by the Soviet plan (ENDC/2), and the consequences, as I have just reviewed them again, of following the Soviet approach would be incredibly to overload the first stage by making it a period in which to get rid not only of all nuclear delivery vehicles or vehicles designed for delivering nuclear weapons but also of most of the important weapons that are usually called conventional.

Third, even if some halfway adequate provisions for carrying out the Soviet disarmament proposal in actual practice could be worked out -- which we seriously doubt, for the reasons just given -- the Soviet Union still refuses to consider any adequate means of verification. Since nuclear delivery vehicles are indeed the most sensitive elements in national arsenals there would have to be firm assurances that pledges of total liquidation of such delivery vehicles were in fact actually and totally carried out. But when we point out this logical consequence of stage I of its proposal the Soviet delegation just ignores the problem by raising the thought-obscuring smokescreen of espionage, which I submit is not very helpful.

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That cannot, however, change our conclusion that 100 per cent elimination of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in stage I would necessitate the complete opening up of national territories to search for hidden stocks. Yet this is a possibility which, in its plan, the Soviet Union only concedes perhaps for the end of the third stage but certainly not before then, and especially not for the end of the first stage. Indeed, the Soviet delegation even rejects the idea of the partial opening up of Soviet territory in the first and second stages, as proposed in our zonal inspection plan, in order to allow some sampling verification of how thoroughly the Soviet Union has in fact lived up to its treaty obligation. Under conditions of such wholly inadequate control measures the opportunities for evasions and violations of treaty commitments would be unlimited, and the national security and even the continued independent existence of some States could be gravely endangered thereby in the process of carrying out general and complete disarmament.

Fourth, the Soviet plan does not offer any suggestions on how any plan for the 100 per cent elimination scheme could be implemented, whether in one stage or in three stages, in such a manner as to ensure that all parties were moving from 100 per cent of such armaments to zero armaments in step, at an equal pace and step by step.

Fifth, as the representative of the United Kingdom said (ENDC/PV.77) once again at our plenary meeting on Friday, 31 August, the Soviet plan fails to take into account the possibility of creating makeshift nuclear delivery vehicles to carry nuclear weapons, which weapons, under the Soviet proposals, would still remain intact in stockpiles at the end of stage I. Chairman Khrushchev's suggestion in his speech of 10 July last (ENDC/47, pp. 10,11) that this risk might be guarded against by allowing every State to retain anti-aircraft missiles, fighter planes, etc. might reduce some of those dangers, but on the other hand the fighter planes would themselves be potential nuclear delivery vehicles, and therefore not all delivery vehicles capable of carrying a nuclear weapon would be eliminated at the end of stage I of the Soviet plan. Hence the proposal, whatever its merits as regards meeting the problem of converted nuclear delivery vehicles, is entirely illogical in the context of the Soviet first stage proposals for 100 per cent elimination of nuclear delivery vehicles.

Sixth, the Soviet plan is entirely vague on the extent to which armaments production would be cut in the first stage, and leaves huge loopholes in its proposals for controlling whatever production limitations might be agreed upon. I will advert later to this question of production in the first stage, to which the representative of India referred this morning.

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One could, of course, add many more items to this list of the advantages for balanced disarmament in the Western plan and drawbacks in the Soviet scheme. However, I think the foregoing are sufficient to give a general picture of the relative positions of the two sides --- the illogical position reflected in the Soviet plan and the realistic, carefully thought through position found in the Western plan.

I have not referred to other problems that arise from the Soviet proposals with regard to first stage measures other than those covered by items 5(a), 5(b) and 5(c) of the long list of first stage topics in document ENDC/52. At the same time I cannot allow to pass by unnoticed a number of statements by various delegations from the communist countries, such as the rather hard, polemical, cold-war speech delivered by Mr. Kuznetsov on 24 August (ENDC/PV.74) and the commentaries on items 5(b) and 5(c) advanced on 29 August (ENDC/PV.76) by the Polish and Romanian delegations. The Soviet delegation's points in regard to item 5(c) put forward on 27 August (ENDC/PV.75) and 31 August (ENDC/PV.77) were, I believe, answered in full by the United States delegation's statement on 29 August (ENDC/PV.76) and the United Kingdom delegation's statement on 31 August (ENDC/PV.77).

An endless amount of complaint has issued forth from Soviet bloc delegations about the supposed lack of attention paid to foreign bases under the United States plan (ENDC/30). However, I sometimes wonder whether the Communist delegations have ever read our plan. I do not believe that they ever have. I already had occasion on 24 August (ENDC/PV.74, p. 41) to note that the Soviet representative was not accurately describing those provisions of document ENDC/30 which do deal with bases. In spite of that, he repeated his incorrect description again on 27 August (ENDC/PV.75, pp. 45-46). I know that the Soviet delegation has in the past flatly opposed our very reasonable proposals. But I should like to think that that is because it has yet to read and to understand them. Thus, I would suggest that its first duty is to know exactly what the United States has suggested in its plan.

There is, of course, no specific provision in document ENDC/30 to deal with military bases in stage I. However, under stage II, on page 24 of that document, it is made explicitly clear that agreed military bases, both foreign and domestic, would be dismantled, with further dismantling in stage III of all remaining bases, wherever located, except those to be left for use by remaining internal security forces, which the Soviet Union calls police or militia. On 27 August the Soviet representative tried to create the impression that our provisions for stage II meant that an understanding on which bases were to be liquidated would only be negotiated during stage II itself. His words were:

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"All that is implied is that in stage II an agreement would be negotiated, but it is not known whether the parties would reach an agreement". (ENDC/PV.75, p. 46)

I just cannot understand how the Soviet representative could say that in view of my unequivocal affirmation at the seventy-fourth meeting that:

"... we provide that even before the treaty is signed an annex will be worked out and will come into existence defining the bases to be eliminated in stages II and III." (ENDC/PV.74, p. 41)

So much for the specific language of our plan (ENDC/30). Let us turn now to the substance of the problem. It is quite apparent that under the Soviet plan for a cut of 100 per cent in nuclear weapon delivery vehicles in the first stage the requirement for the 100 per cent elimination of foreign military bases makes no sense whatsoever. Of course, as I have pointed out again today, the Soviet plan for eliminating nuclear delivery vehicles in the first stage is neither feasible in terms of implementation nor verifiable under the Soviet control schemes. However, for the sake of argument, if it were possible to carry out the Soviet stage I plan effectively that would mean that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union, nor indeed any other country, would have any means whatsoever of delivering nuclear weapons after the end of stage I. Let us assume that that is a fact. Under such conditions, without any ability whatever to deliver nuclear weapons, what would be the great threat to Soviet bloc countries posed by American overseas bases? The answer is none at all. For all practical purposes we would already be completely disarmed. Since, as my delegation and other Western delegations have carefully pointed out, the elimination of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles would mean the elimination of almost the entire military establishment of States, except for actual armed forces, machine guns, perhaps some small artillery and small tanks, and a few other types of weapons, it would therefore be ludicrous to think that any remaining foreign base could become the source of an aggressive attack against the Soviet Union or its allies.

The foreign bases would then, as now, be defensive in character; they would be points at which American troops overseas, with whatever armaments were left to them, stood ready to go to the assistance of their allies if the centralized and unified remaining forces of the USSR should ever launch a conventional attack. It is in fact interesting that the Soviet delegation and its associates have not spent much time alleging that the foreign base liquidation plan fits in logically with the Soviet disarmament scheme, but rather have devoted their major efforts to proving

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that it would be essential, under the American proposal for a 30 per cent across-the-board cut of major armaments in the first stage, to liquidate, or at least to drastically reduce, foreign bases in stage I. They say that if the Soviet Union, under the United States plan, were obliged to cut 30 per cent of its delivery vehicle capabilities in the first stage, while American delivery vehicle capabilities allegedly remained inviolable at foreign bases, that would produce a grave strategic imbalance in favour of the West and against the Soviet Union.

I must really ask the members of this Committee to consider carefully whether that picture painted by the Eastern delegations bears any relation to the real world. My answer would be an emphatic no. After all, under the United States plan (ENDC/3G), United States and United Kingdom nuclear delivery vehicle capabilities would also be cut by 30 per cent in stage I. We would become weaker proportionately in just the same degree as the Soviet Union. It might be said, of course, that the United States would choose to effect the 30 per cent cut in delivery vehicles by means of a much greater cut in vehicles located in the continental United States, while keeping its vehicles at foreign bases intact. Quite clearly, however, that would never happen, and it could never happen. Realistically speaking, under present conditions, when the United States has complete freedom of deployment of its arms and men as it wishes between foreign and domestic bases, it has nevertheless voluntarily chosen, for purely military considerations, to keep some abroad and some at home. That course reflects our own unhampered and best judgment of how we can best ensure the defence of our allies and ourselves. If we were to carry out stage I delivery vehicle reductions only on weapons located in the United States, while leaving weapons located abroad untouched, we would surely upset the proportionate balance which we ourselves have chosen as best for us.

Even beyond that, however, I should like to remind the Soviet bloc delegations that the United States first stage proposal is for a 30 per cent cut in every type of major weapon, including all types of nuclear weapon delivery vehicles. For example, under our plan we must cut 30 per cent of long-range bombardment aircraft, 30 per cent of short-range bombardment aircraft, 30 per cent of medium-range bombardment aircraft, 30 per cent of each of various types of fighter planes, missile-carrying submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles, medium-range ballistic missiles, short-range missiles, and so forth. Moreover, the launching pads associated with the destroyed missiles also would be eliminated -- that is, about 30 per cent of all fixed launching pads. Missiles from reserve stocks, if any, could not replace missiles liquidated at foreign bases because the related fixed launching pads, which would be absolutely essential for their use, would also have been destroyed in stage I.

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In the very nature of things we do not install medium-range ballistic missiles in the continental United States. Why? For the excellent reason that such missiles could never reach foreign targets. Similarly, we do not install intercontinental ballistic missiles in Europe where they would be wasted. The same is generally true for strategic aviation. Therefore, since first stage provisions require a 30 per cent cut in each type of such delivery vehicle, it would be impossible to carry this out without directly affecting the armaments installed at bases abroad. The net result, therefore, is that the nuclear striking power of so-called foreign bases would be reduced by about the same degree as the nuclear striking power of domestic bases in the Soviet Union. Approximately the same conditions of military balance and military posture would prevail between East and West as before the first stage. However, a marked downward turn in arms levels would have begun en route to the total elimination of all delivery vehicles in national forces by the end of stage III.

Of course, I can already hear the chorus of voices from the communist delegations saying that even if all that I have said about bases is correct I still have not refuted their argument that the United States plan does not eliminate the risk of nuclear war in the first stage. To that I reply: one thing at a time.

In the last few minutes I have tried to deal only with the bases issue in depth; but the issue of nuclear war I have handled in another context. On that matter we all know that the joint statement of agreed principles (ENDC/5) sets forth the elimination of the risk of nuclear war -- that is, the elimination of all nuclear arms and all delivery vehicles in national armies -- as a goal of the full three-stage programme of general and complete disarmament. That is also reflected in the agreed portions of article I (ENDC/40/Rev.1).

The Soviet Union, to be sure, is quite free to advocate the objective of eliminating the risk of nuclear war as a goal for stage I, but it cannot claim that that has ever been a generally accepted principle for our work. Indeed, its own plan does not even propose to touch the nuclear weapons themselves, as distinct from nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, until stage II. In any case, the United States delegation has enumerated on many occasions, beginning with the sixth plenary meeting (ENDC/PV.6) -- and I have again recounted them today -- all the reasons why the Soviet proposals for 100 per cent cuts in nuclear delivery vehicles in stage I are totally unrealistic and unrealizable.

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Naturally, the Soviet representative does not like to hear us say that. He charges that the real obstacle is that the West does not want to give up its nuclear delivery vehicles. But that, I submit, is plain nonsense. We are already committed many times over to giving them all up, to eliminating them from our national forces, by the end of stage III. The problem is only how to accomplish it in a sensible, practical, orderly and verifiable manner. It is because the Soviet representative does not want to defend the feasibility of the Soviet plan that he objects to our mention of specific control difficulties or definition problems. He prefers to blur over or distort those problems, or even to push them or wish them away. He has even tried to create a new rule that, as he said on 24 August:

"The only correct way is to seek agreement on the substance of disarmament measures and, as and when such agreement is reached, to work out the appropriate control measures." (ENDC/PV.74, p. 21)

That hardly corresponds to the provisions of paragraph 5 of document ENDC/52 in which, for each stage I item to be discussed, the subject matter is listed "together with appropriate measures of control". In other words, we have agreed that the two problems go hand in hand; and it is certainly true that in some cases the requirements of an adequate verification programme can influence the terms and context in which the disarmament measures themselves will be expressed.

Regarding the substance of control problems, I do not wish to delve deeply today into the complexities of the matter, especially in regard to the zonal inspection proposal which I described fully on 10 August (ENDC/PV.68, pp. 15 et seq.) and on 22 August (ENDC/PV.73, pp. 21-25). The Soviet representative, on 24 August (ENDC/PV.74), found it necessary to invent all sorts of imaginary plans for a pre-emptive or preventive nuclear first strike by the United States against the Soviet Union to scrape together arguments in opposition to the zonal scheme of inspection. In doing so, he tried to create the impression that the zonal plan of inspection opens up colossal opportunities for American espionage at an early stage of the implementation of general and complete disarmament.

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I submit that that is not the case. The representative of the Soviet Union said that the zonal scheme as applied under the United States disarmament plan (ENDC/30) would involve the full opening up of 30 per cent of the Soviet Union in the first stage, which might approximately be the case, and that knowledge of military targets in this area of 7 million square kilometres in the Soviet Union would fill in the intelligence gaps now supposedly existing in the Pentagon, so that the United States pre-emptive nuclear attack which Soviet minds have conjured up could be launched. He went on to argue that both Secretary of Defense McNamara and Professor Henry Kissinger have said that United States strategy requires just such an elimination of intelligence gaps.

We are a peaceful people and we do not wish to have war with anyone, nor do we wish to make pre-emptive nuclear attacks nor any other kind of attacks. United States strategy rests on defence considerations and not on aggressive actions. I wish I could get our Soviet colleague to believe that; but, if he refuses to believe it, it is apparent that no first strike strategy could work if it continued to have intelligence gaps covering 70 per cent of a potential enemy's territory. If we tried it, we ought to have our heads examined. Yet, that would be the very situation with respect to the scope of inspection after the end of stage I. Seventy per cent of Soviet territory would still remain untouched -- a virgin secret wilderness, as far as we were concerned, as far as the inspectors of the international disarmament organization were concerned. Thus, if intelligence gaps existed before stage I began, the great bulk of them would still exist by the time stage II started. And even in the case of the first 30 per cent inspected it cannot be said either that that area would necessarily have all of the choice and most important military targets, or that all matters in it would be revealed to the international disarmament organization.

The Soviet representative appears to have overlooked my statement on 22 August, which reflects our desire to prevent the gathering of military intelligence, as such, during the inspection of a zone. I then said:

"Moreover, the United States does not envisage that the inspection conducted in the selected zone would be without any ground rules.

Surely we could devise arrangements to protect nations from disclosure of certain military information which might be obtained as a result of the inspection of installations, access to which would not be required to ensure verification of agreed measures." (ENDC/PV.73, p. 25)

If, instead of denouncing this zonal plan of inspection as it did at the seventy-fourth plenary meeting, the Soviet Union would only co-operate with us in seeking to work out the details of the zonal scheme of inspection -- because our past comments on it have been only illustrative -- we could undoubtedly devise methods safeguarding Soviet military interests while at the same time carrying out disarmament. For example, procedures could be worked out that might limit the arbitrary selection of zones all in one part of the country. And, further, we could consider ways so that the requirement of early filing of declarations about the military establishment in each zone could not be used to provide data to the other side -- all at once and right at the outset of implementing the treaty -- about the total deployment of forces throughout the entire country on a zone by zone basis. There are still other possibilities which we would be most happy to discuss with our Soviet colleagues.

All this is subject to negotiation and adjustment. What we require is that the Soviet Union recognize that the problem of verifying that the agreed levels of retained arms in stages I, II and most of III is a serious problem which cannot be slurred over, blurred or ignored. We in the West have suggested a compromise method of assuring ourselves against hidden and undeclared stockpiles which lead to violations of treaty pledges about agreed levels. It seems to me intolerable that the Soviet Union both refuses to discuss our suggestions honestly and seriously, and at the same time refuses to make any proposals of its own to deal with that very evident difficulty. As I have already noted today, the favourite claim of the communist delegations is that the Soviet plan (ENDC/2) would end entirely the danger of nuclear war in stage I, while the United States plan (ENDC/30) would not. I have, I believe, shown why, in fact, neither the Soviet plan nor the United States plan would achieve that aim, and why it is wholly unrealistic to

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adopt the untenable Soviet approach. However, I think it worth while now to quote a passage from the speech made on 29 August by the Polish representative, Mr. Naszkowski, who is our Chairman today, to indicate that the motives of the Eastern delegations, in putting their scheme forward, are not quite as high-minded as they would have us all believe, but also have a good deal of self-interest in them.

In speaking of the Soviet draft treaty (ENDC/2) Mr. Naszkowski said:

"The draft takes account of the distribution, throughout Europe and Asia, of United States military bases which do not form part of the United States defence system but are directed against the territories of the Soviet Union and the other Socialist countries. To this we should add that a considerable part of the armed forces of the United States and its allies are stationed on foreign territory in Europe and outside Europe. That is why the Soviet plan proposes, in the first stage, the total abolition of nuclear weapon vehicles, the liquidation of military bases in foreign territory, the withdrawal of armed forces from the territory of other States and, at the same time, a 30 per cent reduction in conventional weapons and a suitable reduction in the manufacture of those weapons." (ENDC/PV.76, p. 27)

I think that is rather interesting and, indeed, quite revealing. It says, to my mind, that the Soviet Union and its allies are unhappy and dissatisfied with the military strength of the United States and its allies, as well as with the deployment of that strength "in and outside Europe". The military strength of the United States now acts as an obstacle to the uses, whether political or military, to which the Soviet bloc would like to put its huge armies and arsenals. Therefore, what the Soviet Union would like to accomplish is to reverse this situation by means of a plan for general and complete disarmament, such as that contained in document ENDC/2, which, as undoubtedly conceived and planned, would hand to the Soviet Union on a silver platter a great strategic victory over the United States at one stroke. As the representative of Poland says in the passage I quoted just now, the aim is to get rid of those United States forces which, in his own words "are directed against the territories of the Soviet Union and the other socialist States"

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The representative of Poland neglected to add that the same plan would establish the Soviet Union as far and away the single dominant military Power in terms of conventional forces in Europe and Asia.

So what I say to the communist delegations is that if they really want to end the military threat that hangs over us all -- as indeed we all should do, and as we do -- they must do so with a plan that accomplishes it on a balanced, fair and equal basis for everyone. They cannot, I submit, hope to win Western approval for the badly conceived, impractical and unjust Soviet plan, which would create a military Utopia for the East and a military trap for the West. We say "No, thank you", and again "No, thank you", to any such project. In fact, I am constrained to quote some words which the Soviet representative himself used -- I would say inappropriately, but in a slightly different context -- on 24 August. Mr. Kuznetsov said then:

"In elaborating control measures, one cannot ignore the state of relations between States and the degree of confidence among them. I should like to suggest to you, gentlemen, representatives of the NATO countries, that you should break away from abstract research, and look at our earth as it is, in all its variety, and, taking this into account, draw up such plans and work out such steps as would really lead here and now to a solution of the problem of general and complete disarmament and not take us further away from it." (ENDC/PV.74, p. 32)

As far as it goes, it seems to me that that is excellent advice. Indeed, I submit that it is advice that should be adopted first and foremost by the Soviet Union itself in regard to the formulation of a realistic plan for general and complete disarmament. So I would say to the Soviet representative that the Soviet Union cannot hope to succeed by advocating a disarmament programme, as it does in its plan (ENDC/2), which would try to alter the political shape and balance of the world during the very process of disarmament and, as one aspect thereof, would seek to imprison the United States on the North American continent. It would be quite enough for any disarmament programme to alter the world's military -- and therefore also political -- situation by the time that the end of the third stage has been reached. Such a change would be the result of achieving total national disarmament -- in other words, the creation of a peaceful world through disarmament. It would not be the result of one-sided moves and plans that created

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new sources of political tension in the world by upsetting the military status quo in stage I. For those cogent reasons I again urge the Soviet Union to reconsider the unrealistic approach contained in its disarmament plan, and to advance towards a practical programme of general and complete disarmament along the well thought out, well founded and realistic lines of the Western plan (ENDC/30).

Since that is the end of my remarks today on general and complete disarmament, I should now like to turn for a few moments to the subject of nuclear testing. In our discussions during the last few days a number of statements have been made about present and future scientific capabilities for detecting, locating and identifying underground nuclear explosions, though those statements have not been keyed to what we can do at any particular threshold -- which, is of course, very important.

After careful examination I do not believe there is any significant difference of opinion among our scientists and those of other countries on those issues. It is, of course, always desirable to be hopeful and expectant about scientific research: in nuclear testing the wish is often father to the thought. So there does seem to have been some tendency to make remarks or write articles in the newspapers on technical capabilities to fit certain preconceptions or preconceived desires without regard to the actual state of certain scientific advances. For that reason I should like now to clarify these issues.

First, we do not now, nor will we ever, have a capability to detect all underground nuclear explosions with remote seismic stations; and why? Well, it is a physical impossibility unless we can at the same time eliminate the pounding waves on the beaches, wind in the mountains, industrial noises and movements of the earth's crust. Moreover, as we lower our threshold to detect we increase the difficulties of identification. In its recent series of underground tests in Nevada the United States has carried out tests measured in tons of yield as well as those in the kiloton or thousand ton range. The smaller ones cannot be detected let alone identified by remote seismic stations. If anyone would like to challenge me on this I should very much like to see his evidence. We would be more than willing to produce ours.

We are of course continuing our seismic research. We hope that our detection capabilities will improve with time, and that we will be able to detect smaller and smaller explosions with remote seismic instruments, but we will not be able to detect

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all interesting nuclear explosions. The United States and the United Kingdom have fully recognized this. We have been doing our level best to reach an agreement with the Soviet Union to ban all nuclear weapon tests in all environments and, in making our proposal for a comprehensive test ban treaty (ENDC/58), we do so with the full realization that a would-be violator would be able to conduct tests in the sub-kiloton range with little fear of detection -- I repeat, in the sub-kiloton range with little fear of detection. In order to get an effective nuclear test ban treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests in all environments, the United States and the United Kingdom are willing to take that risk. That fact is overlooked, but it is an important fact -- that, as a political decision of our two Governments, we decided to take that risk. We cannot go beyond that and accept the risk of a violator conducting tests underground in a range measured in kilotons which for the reasons set forth in the Department of Defense release of 7 July 1962 -- which is before the Conference as document ENDC/45, and which sets forth the results of our recent seismic research -- we may not be able to identify; and for that reason we cannot accept an uninspected moratorium on underground testing.

In considering the questions of clandestine testing underground I should like to point out again -- as I have pointed out in the past -- that recent United States scientific experience shows that relatively small tests conducted underground can be important. I do not intend to minimize that risk and one can go no further than pointing out that truly useful scientific progress in weapon development can be and has been achieved. My statement of 17 August (ENDC/PV.71, p. 20) gives more details of the possible developments involved here through underground tests. That type of progress has been achieved in the past through tests so small that, although they might have been detected by a seismic network, they could not be identified except in an objective on-site inspection. True, they represent only a small part of the arms race, as nuclear testing itself represents only a small part, albeit a significantly large part, of the total arms race. But underground tests represent such a part of the arms race that, I submit, States should not be called upon to assume an obligation not to conduct underground tests unless they can be satisfactorily assured that other nuclear Powers also are not in fact conducting these types of tests. There still seems to be considerable misunderstanding about how important undetected underground explosions may be from a military standpoint. The desire seems to be to shrug them off as not detectable and therefore as not very important.

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With respect to the question of identification, we see no immediate prospect of identifying by seismic means alone all of the events we can now detect. In fact a very substantial fraction cannot now be identified by seismic means alone. It is for that reason that we are so insistent on obligatory on-site inspections, as a matter of right, by the commission, as against a statement of intention to issue an invitation when and if an unidentified event occurs and is certified as such by the commission.

Of course, no one can state absolutely and categorically that in a few years events of the size we can now detect but cannot identify will or will not be identified by seismic means alone. But that is for the indefinite future. We hope that our identification capabilities will greatly improve, and if they do then under our proposed comprehensive treaty to ban all nuclear tests in all environments (ENDC/58), as I pointed out in my remarks on 31 August (ENDC/PV.77) there will be fewer on-site inspections because the international commission will certify fewer events as unidentifiable. But I must say that our best judgment at this time is that there is virtually no hope of unequivocal identification by seismic means alone in the next few months of most unidentified seismic events.

I think almost all responsible scientists would agree that the problem will not disappear completely in a few months for explosions in the high-yield range, namely for explosions of 50 to 100 kilotons with so-called Rainier coupling conditions, and all scientists will probably agree that it will not disappear in a few months in relation to explosions in the range of 1 to 5 kilotons. If we talk in terms of years we are, of course, less certain; the course of scientific progress is too unpredictable. But we would be too optimistic if we were to say that we thought it probable, or even likely, that we would be able to identify by seismic means alone all those events that will really concern us from a military standpoint.

I should now like to turn to an additional point. In his very interesting statement this morning the representative of Burma asked a specific question (ENDC/PV.78, pp. 8-9) with regard to the conduct of on-site inspection under the United Kingdom-United States draft treaty. The question he asked centred around paragraph 6 of article VIII of that treaty (ENDC/58, p. 8) and was directed to the means by which events might be chosen under a quota arrangement for on-site inspection in the United States-United Kingdom draft treaty. The representative of the United

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Kingdom dealt with this in part on 27 August (ENDC/PV.75, pp. 21,22 and 24). I should like at a later point to draw on some of the things which he said at that time in my response to the question that was asked by the representative of Burma this morning.

First, however, I would like to point out that it seems to my delegation that in any arrangement which provides for obligatory on-site inspections there can be at least two possible arrangements. Either one can inspect all of the unidentified events which occur and which cannot be discarded for one reason or another, or one can inspect some number less than all of them. In the United States-United Kingdom draft treaty (ENDC/58) inspection of all events would mean looking in the country's territory at all events certified as unidentified by the international commission on the basis that they had been located and not rendered ineligible because they met certain criteria which would allow them to be discarded as earthquakes. All certified events, if inspected, would mean the inspection of an admittedly very large number of such events in the Soviet Union every year.

On the other hand if -- to meet our Soviet colleague's concern about espionage, as we try to do in our draft treaty -- we have a small quota of events to be inspected every year that means that only a certain number of the total of unidentified events will be selected every year for inspection. The Soviet Union, as I have said, has always indicated that it desired to have only a small number of inspections conducted on its territory each year, and, in view of the Soviet objection to numerous on-site inspections, the United States and the United Kingdom have proposed that only a certain number of those unidentified events should be looked at in each year under some quota arrangement.

The eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28), however, implies that inspections would be conducted of every unidentified event. In that connexion I would like to quote from what the representative of the United Kingdom said on 27 August with regard to the number of inspections under the eight-nation memorandum:

"The memorandum speaks of no quota. It deals in paragraph 4 with any suspicious or significant event. But if it says 'any', then I presume that this must be 'every' such event and, if the parties to the treaty do not give full co-operation in regard to each of these, then the other parties would presumably be free to abrogate the treaty.

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"The facts, which have been made available to members of this Committee in private talks by United States and United Kingdom scientists, lead us to think that there will remain something more than fifty unidentified events a year in, for example, the Soviet Union. Those events will be significant. They will not have been identified. They will be events of the type which might be nuclear, and all of them, under the terms of the memorandum, will be eligible for inspection.

"Therefore, in our new draft we are not calling for more inspection than the eight-nation memorandum, but for less. We do ask, however, that the obligation be clearly and unequivocally accepted by all the parties in advance, and that we consider to be essential if the treaty is to mean anything at all." (ENDC/PV.75, p. 24)

For that reason, therefore, taking into consideration our Soviet colleague's desires -- that is, the fact that they did not want all unidentified events on their territory inspected -- the United States and the United Kingdom have proposed only a small number of on-site inspections, a proposal which involves a certain quota of events to be inspected on the territory of the nuclear Powers each year.

As I have pointed out, the quota arrangement was used -- in order to meet the views of our Soviet colleagues -- so as to reduce the number of on-site inspections while at the same time providing a maximum degree of deterrence. Let me make it clear that for our part we have always been willing to accept automatic inspection by the commission of all unidentified events if the other side will show itself willing to accept the obligation to facilitate such inspection. We are willing, under such circumstances, to accept the "blank cheque" of an unlimited number of inspections by the commission on the territory of the Soviet Union, necessary for the identification of each and every unidentified event; but in such circumstances we are not willing to accept an arrangement under which that blank cheque would "bounce".

As regards the choice of which event might be selected for inspection under a quota system, my delegation has always believed that the selection of the certified events to be inspected should in fairness -- since we are not going to have the right

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to inspect all unidentified events -- be left to the other nuclear side. The other side in each case will of course be the party or parties primarily concerned, although we recognize that every party to the treaty will to some extent be concerned if the control system does not operate in the most effective and efficient manner. A second good reason for leaving this decision in the hands of the other nuclear side under a quota arrangement appears to my delegation to be the necessity of taking speedy action and of avoiding placing upon the commission the burden of taking the final, political decision to conduct an inspection. The commission would of course carry out the inspection as provided for in the United States-United Kingdom treaty.

Let me explain, however, for a moment how my delegation envisages the means by which inspections might be decided upon under a quota system, in order to point out the difficulties that we hope to avoid by leaving the decision to the other nuclear side.

First, the commission would receive the data relating to any particular event and through the executive officer chosen by the commission -- and the Soviet side and the Western side would have equal representation on the commission -- would decide on the basis of treaty criteria whether the event remained unidentified and, therefore, suspicious. Signals from a certain number of stations and of a certain type would have to be received to locate the event in accordance with the treaty. Certain other determinations would have to be made with respect to the event to see whether it would be discarded or certified; for example, its depth of focus would have to be determined to see whether it was below 60 kilometres. After that, each of a large number of certified events would be no more suspicious than the next. The commission, if called upon to make a decision to inspect, would have no more basis for making it than any other nuclear Power on the other side. Therefore it seems to us logical and more efficient to take from the commission's shoulders this very difficult decision and to invest it on the other side, which of course would have great interest in ensuring the most effective control possible.

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Since that is not a scientific decision, and since it is one which involves the commission, while making it, in the consideration of certain very important political problems and questions, the idea in the United States-United Kingdom draft is not to cast doubt upon the ability of any scientist who might be a representative on the commission but merely to avoid the political problems before they arise. Allowing the other side to settle the question means that the commission would not be immersed in what could be an essentially political debate on the inspection of any one particular event.

In sum, my delegation believes that the proposal we have made together with the United Kingdom in our draft treaty for a comprehensive test ban represents the most effective use of a very small quota of on-site inspections in a manner which avoids making the decision to use any of the quota of inspections a difficult and controversial political question.

If the Soviet Union is not interested in having a small quota of on-site inspections on its territory but would prefer to have the commission inspect all unidentified events, I hope it will say so, and then we could proceed, I believe, to very fruitful negotiations on this point. In the drafting of our treaty we were doing our level best to negotiate on what we thought was a very realistic basis, in order to meet the idea which the Soviet Union has expressed to us again and again that it did not want a large number of inspections on its territory. If for any reason our Soviet colleagues have changed their minds on that point I should be only too happy to hear it.

The United States hopes that the Soviet Union will present a favourable response to the proposal made by the delegations of the United Kingdom and the United States to continue meetings of the Sub-Committee on a test ban treaty during the recess. This is particularly true because there is apparent agreement among the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom and the United States now on a cut-off date for testing, as proposed (ENDC/PV.34, p. 16) by the representative of Mexico. It is our belief that in the light of this factor the negotiations ought to continue during the recess, here in Geneva, with the dual objectives of a treaty to end all nuclear tests in all environments for all time or, if this should prove impossible, of achieving the widest area of agreement possible, thereby ceasing tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and under water.

Mr. KUZNETSOV (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): Mr. Chairman, the Soviet delegation has listened with great interest today to the statements by the representatives of Burma, Czechoslovakia, Nigeria, Ethiopia, India and Brazil (ENDC/PV.78). We shall carefully study the useful considerations they have put forward with a view to facilitating a settlement of the controversial issues which still remain along the path to reaching agreement on the banning of all nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space, underwater and underground.

We shall also study their remarks on the reduction of conventional armaments, and the questions which have been put in this regard.

Unfortunately, the United States representative in his statement today did not say anything which gives ground for encouragement, or which shows that the United States is trying to settle, on a realistic and mutually acceptable basis, the fundamental differences of opinion on the main provisions of a draft treaty on general and complete disarmament. The United States refuses to listen to the insistent demand of the peoples of all countries that the threat of a destructive thermonuclear war should be eliminated as quickly as possible. The United States, as in the past, refuses to consider steps and arrangements which would render the use of nuclear weapons virtually impossible by the end of stage I.

The United States representative has once again advanced some far-fetched arguments against the proposals for the elimination in stage I of all nuclear weapon delivery vehicles, the dismantling of all foreign military bases on alien territories and the withdrawal of foreign troops therefrom.

In earlier statements the Soviet delegation and a number of other delegations have demonstrated the unsoundness of the arguments advanced by the Western Powers against the inclusion of these disarmament measures in stage I. In Mr. Dean's statement today no answer has been given on the question of foreign military bases. He merely reaffirmed that United States bases on foreign territory are needed in order to carry on an aggressive policy against peace-loving countries and to aggravate the international situation. There are many facts to show that the American military bases in Taiwan, Southern Korea, South Vietnam and other countries are used for carrying out provocations against neighbouring peace-loving States. One argument which Mr. Dean advanced today in defence of United States military bases on foreign territory deserves our attention. Mr. Dean told the Committee that the

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United States is maintaining its military bases in the Far East, for instance, in Taiwan, so that Chiang Kai Shek's people could defend the United States. Mr. Dean considers, it appears, that without the assistance of Chiang Kai Shek's people, the security of the United States would be threatened and could not be safeguarded! This argument speaks for itself. It shows the artificiality of the arguments of the United States for maintaining American military bases on foreign territory. Experience shows that the existence of foreign military bases increases tension in relations between States. Such bases cannot serve the purpose of maintaining and consolidating peace or strengthening confidence between States and peoples.

We have to note with regret that there is still a deep gulf between the positions of the sides on this important question of the measures for the first stage of the plan for general and complete disarmament. But the Soviet Union, in the future as in the past, will not spare any efforts in its attempt to settle controversial issues on a mutually acceptable basis, to conclude an agreement on general and complete disarmament as soon as possible, and to eliminate the threat of war on our planet for all time.

Now the Soviet delegation would like once again to express its views on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, in connexion with the documents submitted on 27 August 1962 by the United States and the United Kingdom (ENDC/58 and ENDC/59). That is all the more necessary because in giving additional explanations Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber in their statements tried to contest our assessment of those documents and moreover in a number of cases they ascribed to the Soviet delegation statements which it had never made. Also, in connexion with the questions which the delegations of a number of States have put to us in the Committee, we intend to clarify some aspects of our position on the matter.

Let us start with the "draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments". (ENDC/58) At the Committee's seventy-eighth meeting and again today, the United States representative, Mr. Dean, tried very hard to make out that absolutely new proposals were contained in that draft and a considerable step was being taken towards meeting the Soviet Union. On the last occasion Mr. Dean asserted that the Soviet delegation's assessment of the United States - United Kingdom draft as a somewhat refurbished version of the old, impracticable proposals of the United States and the United Kingdom was incorrect in point of fact.

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Well, let us turn to the facts, and let us see how much the present position of the United States and the United Kingdom, as set forth in this document, differs from their former position, which obstructed any possibility of reaching agreement on the discontinuance of all nuclear weapon tests. What was the substance of the old United States and United Kingdom proposals of 18 April 1961 (ENDC/9), and why were they unacceptable?

As the Soviet delegation has pointed out on a number of occasions, the United States - United Kingdom proposals of 18 April 1961 were aimed at establishing, under the pretext of carrying out international control over the cessation of nuclear weapons tests, a widespread network of espionage in the interests of the circles which are preparing for a nuclear war. That was the purpose underlying the proposals to establish a cumbersome international administration to supervise the cessation of tests, to establish the post of a single administrator of the international control system invested with full powers, to locate large numbers of international control posts on the territories of States, and to carry out obligatory on-site inspections with international inspection teams. Those are the main elements of which the United States and United Kingdom proposals of 18 April 1961 were composed.

And now? What new elements have the United States and the United Kingdom introduced into their proposals? Let us compare the draft submitted on 18 April 1961 with that submitted on 27 August 1962. Let us try by means of that comparison to find out whether there has been any substantial change in the positions of the United States and the United Kingdom over these eighteen months, during which it has become quite clear that strict verification of the fulfilment by all States of their undertakings to discontinue nuclear weapon tests does not require any cumbersome international control organization, or a system of international control posts, or obligatory international on-site inspections; and that national systems are fully adequate for detecting nuclear explosions.

In the new document of the United States and the United Kingdom, (ENDC/58) it is easy to detect all the elements of the same international control organization which were envisaged in their former proposals. Once again there are references not only to the establishment of an international commission, but also to the creation of a world-wide verification system, systematic supervision over all elements of the control system, a large international staff, agreements between the commission and States, and so on and so forth. All that, of course, goes far beyond what might be

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useful and appropriate in order to verify that States are fulfilling their obligations under a treaty for the discontinuance of nuclear weapons tests. All that is also infinitely far removed from the system of control over the discontinuance of tests on a "purely scientific and non-political basis" as proposed in the eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28) and particularly from the international commission consisting of a limited number of highly qualified scientists, which the memorandum proposes.

Even with the aid of a magnifying glass, it is difficult to find anything new in the "new" proposals of the United States and the United Kingdom in regard to the international control organization. Except perhaps the fact that, whereas it was formerly proposed that members of the international commission should serve for a period of two years, (article 4 of the draft treaty of 18 April 1961: ENDC/9), it is now proposed that the period should be extended to three years (article IV of the new draft); or another "important" difference, such as the fact that, whereas the international control commission was formerly to meet whenever it thought fit, its members are now to hold meetings "at such time as they may determine".

There is yet another "new" feature. In the United States - United Kingdom proposals of 27 August 1962 the international commission is called "scientific", a word which was not used in the former proposals. It is obvious that this is a sort of tribute paid by the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom to the times, an attempt to create the impression that their proposals now take into account the eight-nation memorandum. But the fact of the matter is that the United States and the United Kingdom are not proposing to establish a scientific advisory body of a non-political character, but a complicated piece of international machinery with excessively wide powers including the right to take decisions binding on States on matters directly affecting their national security. From the eight-nation memorandum the United States and the United Kingdom have merely taken a label for their old machinery, which is designed to serve as the organizational framework of an international system of espionage, under the pretence of exercising control over the cessation of tests.

Let us take a further look. Both the old and the "new" proposals of the United States and the United Kingdom contain a provision regarding the appointment of a single director of the international control system. The only difference - if it can be called a difference - is that, whereas the Western Powers formerly called this

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director "the chief executive officer", or "administrator" they now call him the "executive officer". There may indeed be a slight verbal difference here, but it does not affect the substance of the matter. In both cases the person referred to is a highly placed international official in whose hands it is proposed to place extensive personal powers including the right to take, at his discretion, the most important decisions directly affecting the security of a State. In accordance with the draft, the executive officer will have to determine whether or not a given located event falls within the category of events which are subject to on-site inspection. (ENDC/58, Art VIII, para.1) The executive officer will have to make up the international inspection teams to be despatched to the territories of States to verify such events. (ibid., Article VIII, para.10) Furthermore, in the new draft (Article VIII, para.6) as in the former draft, it is envisaged that on-site inspection shall be carried out at the request of parties, that is, a decision to make an on-site inspection on the territory of the USSR will be taken at the request of the United States and the United Kingdom. (ibid., Article VIII, para.6)

It is plain for all to see that this throws the door wide open for arbitrary actions and abuses in those very matters in which, in present-day circumstances, it is particularly essential to display the greatest possible caution and the greatest possible consideration for the interests of all States.

Let us take the next question - the establishment of a system of control posts on the territories of States. Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber have been trying hard to convince the Committee that it is precisely in regard to control posts that the Western Powers have revised their position in a very substantial way. If one listened to them, it would appear that the United States and the United Kingdom have practically accepted the proposal that national systems should be used for detecting nuclear explosions, a proposal which is supported by all those who approach the problem of the cessation of tests realistically and from a business-like standpoint.

But have they really accepted this proposal? On examination, it appears that the exact contrary is the case. The United States - United Kingdom draft of 27 August 1962 envisages that supervision of the fulfilment of the agreement on the discontinuance of tests shall be carried out by control posts or stations on the territories of States, the stations to be of three types, as follows:

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firstly, stations constructed by the international commission and manned by an international staff appointed by the commission;
secondly, national stations staffed by nationals of the States on whose territory they are located, subject to the proviso that the State concerned will accept at such stations international observers appointed by the commission;
thirdly, national stations designated by the State in agreement with the commission and manned by nationals of the States on whose territory they are located.

Moreover, in the draft treaty of 27 August 1962, it is envisaged that the international commission may use instruments for detecting nuclear explosions in outer space, in the atmosphere and in certain other environments; that those instruments are to be maintained and manned either by Parties to the Treaty or by the commission itself; and the choice between the two possibilities in each specific case is to be left to the commission itself. (ENDC/58, Article VII, para 1 (d))

But the United States - United Kingdom proposals of 18 April 1961 (ENDC/9) also contained references to international control posts or stations, the establishment of a system of satellites and the detection of possible nuclear explosions in outer space. Thus, the very same matters were referred to in the 1961 proposals too. Admittedly, it is now conceded that certain control stations will be national, but stations of that type are obviously assigned a secondary role, and are lost in a widespread network, the greater part of which would be international, not only de facto but also de jure.

We are told that there will be somewhat fewer international control stations and posts than the United States and the United Kingdom asked for eighteen months ago. But does that make any difference in the substance of the matter? The principle of establishing control posts remains unchanged, and it is still fully possible for those posts to be used for purposes which have nothing whatever to do either with control over the cessation of nuclear weapons tests or with the interests of peace.

Now, a word about the most important point which, as Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber have emphasized on a number of occasions, constitutes the very core of the United States and United Kingdom proposals for the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests.

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

I refer to obligatory on-site inspection. Perhaps on that question there have been some changes in the positions of the United States and the United Kingdom? Perhaps there the Western Powers have taken a step forward to meet the Soviet Union? In that connexion let us turn to the text.

In article VIII, paragraph 11, of the United States and United Kingdom proposals of 27 August 1962, it is stated that:

"Each of the Parties undertakes to give inspection teams, despatched pursuant to this Article, immediate and undisputed access to the area in which an on-site inspection is to be conducted, to refrain from interference with any operation of an inspection team and to give such teams the assistance they may require in the performance of their mission". (ENDC/58, p.9)

But what did the former United States and United Kingdom proposals say on that matter? Article 12, paragraph 5, of the draft treaty on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests, submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom on 18 April 1961, was worded as follows:

"Each of the parties undertakes to give inspection groups, despatched pursuant to the provisions of Article 10, immediate and undisputed access to the area in which an on-site inspection is to be conducted, to refrain from interference with any operation of an inspection group and to give such groups the assistance they may require in the performance of their mission". (ENDC/9, p.27)

As you see, the only things which have been changed are the paragraph numbers; while the text itself has been transferred from the former draft treaty to the new one without any changes either in content or even in form.

At the seventy-eighth meeting, Mr. Dean tried to convince us that there had been some change in the position of the Western Powers in regard to the composition of the inspection teams. Perhaps that is indeed the case? Let us turn once again to the texts. In article 9, paragraph 3 C (viii) of the draft treaty of 18 April 1961, it is stated that:

"The scientific and technical staffs of on-site inspection groups shall be composed of technically qualified personnel who are not Nationals of the country exercising jurisdiction or control over the territory in which the events under investigation may have occurred." (ibid. p.17).

(Mr. Kuznetsov, USSR)

Now, in article VIII, paragraph 10 of the draft treaty of 27 August 1962 it is stated that in forming inspection teams,

"the Executive Officer shall ensure the adequate representation of scientific and technical skills and shall avoid composition which would result in the inspection of territory under the jurisdiction or control of a State by any nationals of that State". (ENDC/58, p.9).

So now, as eighteen months ago, it is proposed to create conditions in which it would be possible for the Executive Officer of the international control organization to refuse to allow nationals of the country on whose territory the inspection is being carried out to become members of the inspection team. In other words, it is proposed that the State most directly concerned should be completely barred from taking part in a verification carried out on its territory.

An analysis of the provisions of the draft treaty of 27 August 1962 relating to on-site inspection shows that on that matter the Western Powers are now trying to make their position even more rigid than it was in 1961. That is shown, for example, by article VIII, paragraph 4 of the draft treaty of 27 August 1962, in which it is envisaged that - I quote -.

"Data provided by stations in territory under the jurisdiction or control of a State in which the event may be located may not be used to render it ineligible for inspection but may be used to assist in establishing eligibility for inspection". (ENDC/58, p. 8)

I draw special attention to this paragraph.

How are we to understand this provision which was not included even in the draft treaty of 18 April 1961? It means that, if data received from stations located in the Soviet Union - to give one illustration - show that there are no grounds for any suspicions or doubts regarding any events on the territory of the USSR, these data must not be taken into account at all. It is proposed, in fact, that data received from stations nearest to the event should be brushed aside and that findings should be based on some other less reliable data. On the other hand, it turns out that data submitted by a country in which an event has taken place may still be used. But for what? Exclusively to confirm the existence of certain circumstances which could be used for carrying out an on-site inspection. That is very significant.

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Is it not clear that the United States and United Kingdom proposals offer considerable possibilities for arbitrary actions by the staff of the international control organization which might endanger the security of States?

Furthermore, such a system might affect the sovereign rights of States and their self-respect. Is it not insulting to a State to be included in advance, according to this draft treaty, among the clandestine violators of the future treaty, and to declare in advance that the data from its observation stations are deliberately falsified and cannot be trusted? Permit me to ask what sort of approach this is? What are we going to achieve with such an approach? Can one expect a self-respecting government responsible for the security and independence of its country to agree to such a treaty which has been, if I may say so, "scientifically" prepared in the interests of intelligence work?

The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom have tried to prove in their statements that the "new" element in their positions on the question of on-site inspection is their readiness to agree to a slightly smaller number of obligatory inspections. But a closer study shows this too is nothing more than a phrase.

While they declare their readiness to reduce slightly the quota of international inspections, the United States and the United Kingdom raise the question of the need to revise their previous proposals regarding the area eligible for inspection in each specific case. In what direction do the Western Powers intend to revise this position? As we gather from Mr. Dean's explanations, the revision is to be made in the direction of extending the area eligible for inspection in each specific case. Fewer inspections but a larger area - that is what we gather from the draft treaty of the Western Powers.

We are also bound to mention the fact that the United States and the United Kingdom want to discuss endless technical questions relating, for instance, to the criteria for obligatory on-site inspection. Mr. Dean demonstrated today what such a discussion could lead to. On all those questions fruitless discussions could be carried on for many years, and they have already been carried on during the three years of negotiations between the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom in Geneva. It is precisely those technical questions that have been used by the Western Powers as a quagmire in which the Geneva three-Power Conference on the discontinuance of nuclear weapon tests has got stuck.

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We could go on comparing the two drafts submitted to the Committee by the United States and the United Kingdom, one on 18 April 1961 and the other on 27 August 1962, but in view of the late hour I think there is no need for this, since it is sufficiently clear from what has been said that the main contents of those documents are identical. It is impossible not to reach the conclusion, if one is honest, that the "draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments" (ENDC/58) does not correspond even in a slight extent either to the letter or to the spirit of the eight-nation memorandum. (ENDC/28) Nor does it take into account other proposals of the representatives of these countries aimed at speeding up the working out of a solution to the problem of banning all experimental nuclear weapon explosions which would be acceptable to all the States concerned.

In the light of all that has been said, the statement made by Mr. Dean at previous meeting of the Committee (ENDC/PV.77, pp. 42-43), in which he said that he was sure he echoed the sentiments of the eight nations which submitted the memorandum on the question of stopping tests, sounded particularly "convincing". We have always understood hitherto that an echo should reproduce sounds exactly and not replace them by different sounds. But what happened in this particular case?

The representatives of the eight countries expressed their views on the way in which, in their opinion, the outstanding controversial questions preventing agreement from being reached on the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests should be overcome with due regard to the actual conditions existing in the world. They set out their ideas in the form of a memorandum, and they still regard this memorandum as a good basis for reaching agreement. In that connexion one can refer to many statements made by the representatives of the non-aligned countries. I will refer, for instance, to the statement of the representative of Brazil, Mr. Castro, who said on 31 August 1962:

"My delegation firmly believes that the eight-nation joint memorandum is still the best available document to help negotiations on a comprehensive test ban." (ENDC/PV.77, p. 24)

A similar statement was made by the representative of Sweden, Mr. Edberg, on 31 August (ENDC/PV.77, p. 30). This morning the representative of Ethiopia, Mr. Amalayehu, the representative of Burma, Mr. Barrington, and the representative of Nigeria, Mr. Mbu, stressed once again that in the existing circumstances in the negotiations the memorandum provides a real way out of the impasse. (ENDC/PV.78)

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If Mr. Dean is sure he echoes the sentiments of the eight non-aligned States, why does the United States not accept their memorandum as the basis for negotiations on the controversial issues? We said long ago that we were prepared to do so. But we have not heard any similar statement from the United States delegation. What Mr. Dean tries to pass off as the echo of the voice of the eight nations is in reality an altogether different sound and moreover one that we have heard many times in the past from the Western Powers in the negotiations.

In that connexion, permit me to quote a statement from a newspaper appearing in the capital of one of the countries which submitted the eight-nation memorandum. The newspaper, The Voice of Ethiopia, said:

"The new draft treaty submitted by the United States and the United Kingdom is so much a copy of their old proposals that it really provides no grounds for optimism."

and it continued:

"The time has come when the great Powers should no longer submit such trifling proposals but listen seriously to the views of neutral countries on the question of the prohibition of nuclear weapon tests."

We are in agreement with this assessment of the draft treaty banning all nuclear weapon tests in all environments put forward by the United States and United Kingdom on 27 August 1962 for the consideration of the Committee. (ENDC/58) There is no need for it whatsoever, unless, of course, the aim is to continue hampering the working out of an acceptable solution. The Soviet delegation would like to state with the utmost clarity that this draft cannot be taken as a basis for negotiations on the question of putting an end to all nuclear tests. In our opinion, it cannot be doubted that it was submitted to the Committee with no expectation whatsoever of reaching agreement on it.

With regard to Mr. Dean's claim that he accurately echoes the statements of other delegations, we must unfortunately note that at a previous meeting of the Committee Mr. Dean grossly distorted one of the statements of the Soviet delegation. (ENDC/PV.77, p. 43) Mr. Dean asserted that the representative of the Soviet Union had stated at the meeting of 29 August 1962 that radioactive fall-out has no harmful effects. What Mr. Dean said was untrue. This is what was said by the representative of the Soviet Union at the meeting on 29 August on this subject:

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"The Soviet Government, like the Governments of all other peace-loving countries, is concerned at the consequences which may arise in connexion with radioactive fall-out as a result of nuclear tests.

This is one of the reasons why it is steadfastly and consistently striving to put an end to all nuclear tests for all time." (ENDC/PV.76, p.21)

Now I should like to deal with the proposal of the United States and the United Kingdom for the conclusion of a limited or partial treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater. (ENDC/59)

First of all, we must say that the Soviet Union considers it both possible and desirable to conclude without delay a treaty on the cessation of all nuclear tests - in the atmosphere, in outer space, underwater and underground. The existing national means of detection of nuclear explosions available to States are quite adequate even at the present time for exercising control over the implementation of such a treaty by all States.

However, the actual fact is that at present the Western Powers are not prepared to consent to the conclusion of an agreement to put an end to all nuclear weapon tests on mutually acceptable terms. We must take this fact into account, since it is impossible to conclude a treaty to put an end to all nuclear weapon tests without the participation of the Western Powers.

In the existing situation the Soviet Union is prepared to go half way to meet the Western Powers and conclude at the present stage an agreement banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater. As regards underground nuclear explosions, we must come to an agreement to continue negotiations on that question. It goes without saying that during the period while negotiations are going on for the conclusion of a treaty on the terms of the prohibition also of underground tests, States should refrain from carrying out experimental underground nuclear explosions and give a corresponding undertaking. We can state quite definitely that if we were to take such a path where, after agreeing to stop tests in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater, we would at the same time continue underground nuclear tests, the peoples would not understand such a solution to the question. Such a solution would not put an end to the nuclear arms race, but on the contrary it would create, so to speak, a legal basis for continuing such a race, with underground explosions being used for testing the latest models of nuclear weapons.

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The discussions in the Committee have shown that a large majority of the States are now coming to the conclusion that it is desirable at the present stage to have precisely such a solution to the problem of banning tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater, as would make it possible to reach an agreement straight away, while at the same time States would give an undertaking not to conduct underground nuclear explosions either and would continue negotiations in the meantime for the definitive prohibition of such explosions. In that connexion I would remind you of the statements made by the representatives of India, Nigeria, Brazil and Sweden and a number of other countries at the meetings of the Committee. All of them stated unambiguously that the proposal of the United States and the United Kingdom for the conclusion of a limited or partial agreement cannot be an alternative to an agreement banning all nuclear weapon tests.

The representative of Sweden, for example, said on 31 August 1962:

"We do not regard a treaty of such a more limited nature as an alternative to a test ban treaty embracing all categories of tests ... We consider that no effort should be spared until all tests in all environments have been outlawed for all the future." (ENDC/PV.77,p.35)

The prohibition of nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater, together with a simultaneous agreement of the States not to conduct underground nuclear explosions during the period of the negotiations for the conclusion of an agreement which would also cover this type of nuclear explosions, places no one in a privileged position and does not create a threat to the security of anyone. That is a realistic approach to the solution of the question of stopping nuclear weapon tests which could be reached in the present situation and would meet the interests of all the peoples of the world.

The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom have declared here that their Governments will in no circumstances agree to assume an obligation to refrain from conducting underground nuclear tests while negotiations for the conclusion of a definitive agreement on that question are going on. They asserted as their reason for that attitude that in 1961 the Soviet Union had allegedly violated some sort of agreement or moratorium on nuclear tests.

I do not intend at present to go into the background of the question of nuclear weapon tests, but permit me, Mr. Chairman, to give Mr. Dean and Mr. Godber some historical information: there never was, unfortunately, any agreement between the

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nuclear Powers for a moratorium on underground or any other kind of nuclear weapon tests. The representatives of the United States and the United Kingdom know that quite well. Neither in 1961 nor earlier did the nuclear Powers conclude any international agreement binding them to refrain from conducting nuclear weapon tests. Consequently, there are no grounds for asserting that the Soviet Union allegedly violated some sort of agreement with the Western Powers for a moratorium on experimental nuclear explosions.

But what really happened in the years 1958 to 1961? During those years the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Union refrained from conducting nuclear weapon tests, but they did so voluntarily without concluding any kind of international agreement on this subject. As for the voluntariness of this abstention, on 27 December 1959 the then President of the United States, Mr. Eisenhower, stated clearly and definitely that the United States no longer considered itself bound by its statement about refraining from nuclear weapon tests. Yet France - an ally of the United States and the United Kingdom - was conducting one nuclear explosion after another during that time.

At the seventy-seventh meeting the United States representative also preferred modestly to say nothing about the fact that the United States is continuing to conduct nuclear weapon tests which it started as far back as September 1961. Moreover, as is well known, the United States has switched the nuclear arms race into outer space as well.

It is not the Soviet Union which was responsible for the first nuclear test explosions and their continuation. It is well known that every time the Soviet Government was compelled to conduct nuclear tests it was merely replying to the corresponding actions of the Western Powers, and first and foremost the United States.

The representatives of the Western Powers realize quite well what we are concerned with at the present time. The question is that all the nuclear Powers should reach an agreement in an appropriate form to assume an obligation not to conduct underground nuclear explosions from the moment a treaty banning nuclear tests in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater has been concluded; it being implied that this obligation would be replaced later by a treaty banning underground nuclear tests. After that, all nuclear weapon tests would thus be banned for all time. Obviously, the aforesaid agreement not to conduct underground nuclear weapon tests would in that case have binding force under international law, which was never the case previously.

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The position of the United States and the United Kingdom on the question of underground nuclear explosions does not take into account the real possibilities of solving the problem and does not meet the demands of the peoples of the world.

In that connexion, I think it appropriate to draw your attention to an article published in the English newspaper The Observer of 2 September 1962 under the heading 'The Gap Shrinks'. Speaking generally in favour of stopping all nuclear tests, this newspaper states:

"But if the aim is to increase international security, even if it involves balancing one risk against another, then the Western case is less convincing."

The Soviet Union is in favour of strengthening peace and international security by all possible means.

In conclusion, the Soviet delegation would like to say that if the United States and the United Kingdom intend as seriously as the Soviet Union to put an end to nuclear explosions, it will be possible in a very short time to reach an agreement acceptable to both sides to ban nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space and underwater and to agree on the question of stopping underground nuclear explosions. In that case, good prospects would open up before us. The Soviet delegation is prepared also in the future to contribute in every way to the success of such negotiations.

Mr. MALITZA (Romania): The Romanian delegation wishes once more to state its position on the problem of the conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests. The Government of the Romanian People's Republic stands for the prohibition of all nuclear weapon tests in all environments and for all time. The Romanian delegation has followed with the greatest attention all proposals made in that connexion and is prepared to give its support to any proposals genuinely aimed at opening the door to an agreement on that issue. A way towards that end was pointed out on 16 April by the eight-nation memorandum (ENDC/28) which the Soviet delegation and the other Socialist delegations accepted as the basis for negotiation. There were also other proposals put forward, such as the one made by the representative of Mexico, Mr. Padilla Nervo, on 9 May, (ENDC/PV.34, p.16) concerning the establishment of a target date for the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests.

The Romanian delegation has also carefully studied the draft treaties submitted by the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom in order to find out whether and to what extent they are of such a nature as to promote an agreement on that most important issue. The representatives of the Western nuclear Powers assert that the two draft treaties answer that requirement as they allegedly contain new

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and negotiable proposals which correspond to the eight-nation memorandum.

Thus the representative of the United Kingdom, Mr. Godber, states on 27 August 1962:

"Both these offers are new offers ... both offers are negotiable." (ENDC/PV.75, pp. 20, 21)

Similarly, the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, said: "the United Kingdom and the United States have taken that memorandum and have used it ... in drafting an entire treaty." (ENDC/PV.77, p. 42)

Let us consider briefly whether those assertions are in accordance with reality. Let us take the first draft, entitled "Draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in all environments" (ENDC/58). In view of the thorough and very convincing analysis made by the representative of the Soviet Union, Mr. Kuznetsov, today, I should like to add only a few remarks.

When comparing the present draft treaty paragraph by paragraph with that of 18 April 1961 of the United States and the United Kingdom (ENDC/19), as we have done, we note that the bulk of the provisions remain in essence unchanged. With regard to either the control stations within the framework of an international system, their management and their supervision, or the functions of the executives, and so on, one cannot but draw the conclusion that the changes are only formal and do not alter the core of the previous Western positions. The control organization is now called a commission of scientists, the manager becomes an executive, and so forth. In other words, one uses old formulae retrieved from the archives of past nuclear test ban negotiations. We wonder, at the same time, what remains negotiable in this offer by the United States and the United Kingdom, since the acceptance by the Soviet Union of obligatory international on-site inspection and control is made a condition sine qua non for the attainment of an agreement.

Finally, with regard to the assertion made by the Western delegations to the effect that their proposals of 27 August are based on the eight-nation memorandum, we note the following. The memorandum does not provide for obligatory on-site inspection. The draft treaty (ENDC/58) insists upon the obligatory nature of international inspection. The eight-nation memorandum provides that the supervision over compliance by States with the obligation to refrain from testing be effected through the existing national stations for the detection of nuclear explosions. The proposal embodied in document ENDC/58 envisages an expanded system of international control posts in the territory of States parties to the treaty under the supervision of the international commission, a system which would make it the central and supreme authority in that

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field. The Western Powers are very insistent about that. According to their proposals the control stations would be manned by nationals of the States on whose territories those stations were located. But that is not a measure capable of defining the national character of stations, as the functions provided for in this draft treaty (ENDC/58) for the central link with regard to the stations are almost identical with those set forth within the framework of the previous United States and United Kingdom draft of April 1961, which undoubtedly was based on international control posts.

The eight-nation memorandum provides, further, only for an international commission consisting of a limited number of highly qualified scientists as the principal link in the system of verification over compliance with the terms of a treaty banning nuclear weapon tests. The proposals of the Western nuclear Powers provide for a one-man management with central ruling functions to be exercised over the whole system of international control.

The contradiction between the proposals of the Western nuclear Powers and the memorandum results also from the fact that the United States and the United Kingdom offer as a big concession a reduction in the number of control stations. If they were national stations, there would be no point in reducing them, but the authors of the proposals we are examining are well aware that precisely a system of predominantly international control is meant in this case.

Today the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, spoke about limitation of the capacity of the detection systems to cope with small seismic events. We wish to draw the Committee's attention to the fact that Mr. Dean speaks about the incapacity of a remote station. On 14 August 1962 (ENDC/PV.69, p.20) he asserted also -- as he has asserted again recently -- that the detection system of distant stations for seismic events would every year detect numerous events in either the United States or the Soviet Union which it would not be able to identify. The key words in both statements are "remote" or "distant". But, we are justified in asking, what about the nearby stations, what about the national system of detection? Why is this idea, central to the eight-power memorandum, systematically put aside and avoided?

In his intervention today the representative of the United States gave further proof of the fact that the United States system is a long way from the concept of the authors of the memorandum. He wants the choice of the on-site inspection to be

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taken from the international commission and given to the other nuclear party. There, finally, we have full recognition of the political character of on-site inspection, which in past interventions the Western delegations have claimed to be exclusively scientific and objective.

The conclusion to be drawn is that the first draft treaty is neither new nor consonant with the compromise solutions presented to the Committee. As to its capacity with regard to opening up new avenues, it is heavily loaded with elements which in the past have shown their foolproof anti-agreement capacity.

Let us now pass to the second draft treaty (ENDC/59) -- the draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater. We know that similar proposals were made by the former President of the United States on 13 April 1959 (GEN/DNT/53). On 11 February 1960 the United States proposed a phased treaty which, in the first stage, would ensure:

"the cessation of all nuclear weapon tests in the earth's atmosphere, in the oceans, and in outer space up to the greatest height with respect to which agreement can be reached on the installation of effective controls."

(GEN/DNT/PV.170, p.5)

That proposal was, in fact, reiterated with slight modifications on 3 September 1961 (GEN/DNT/120) by the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, and the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Mr. Macmillan. The draft treaty submitted on 27 August takes up those proposals again. But it is a new proposal, Mr. Dean tells us, (ENDC/PV.77, p. 39) as new as a new-born baby. What can one say about a child that, after so many years, still looks new-born?

In fact, if we study the contents of the proposal put forward on 27 August and compare them with the previous proposals we cannot help being struck by the steadfastness of the United States and the United Kingdom in striving to secure for themselves the possibility of continuing nuclear weapon tests in the environments in which they are interested, and always underground. It obviously remains the intention of the United States and United Kingdom Governments to perpetuate the nuclear arms race and to assure for themselves military advantages. Indeed, such proposals seek to legalize underground nuclear weapon tests. In order to understand an international document it is of equal interest to know what it says and what it does not say. Banning nuclear weapon tests in three environments when there are

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four environments in which they could be carried out would be tantamount to allowing, tolerating, legalizing, tacitly and implicitly, tests in that fourth environment.

Qui dicit de uno negat de altero. The proposal of the Western nuclear Powers might be read to mean the following: nuclear weapon tests are banned in three environments. But it might well be read to mean: in the fourth environment -- underground -- those tests may continue without hindrance.

The essence of the problem is that, until a satisfactory solution is found which will permit the conclusion of a treaty banning underground tests too, States must pledge themselves not to carry out further underground tests. But if the United States and the United Kingdom adhere to their previous position and maintain that, as pointed out by Mr. Dean,,

"No matter what term is used -- voluntary restraint, gentleman's agreement, exercise of voluntary control, or moratorium -- the United States just cannot accept such arrangements" (ENDC/PV.77. p.46),

what remains of the negotiability claimed for the draft treaty? The continuance of underground nuclear tests implies -- and that is a matter of great importance -- the danger of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their dissemination among many other States. At his Press conference on 28 August the President of the United States, Mr. Kennedy, emphasized the increased danger. He said:

"I consider the constant development of new and more dangerous weapons not only by the United States and the Soviet Union but by other Powers, and particularly the very strong possibility that proliferation will mark this decade if we do not get an agreement, as a matter of maximum peril."

Mr. Dean asserted that the banning of nuclear weapon tests in three environments would compel other States to refrain from underground testing, but we think that, on the contrary, the legalization of underground tests would stimulate such tests by other States, since they could be more easily carried out in their territories. In the same connexion, one should of necessity pay heed to the fact that the small nuclear weapons can be tested and perfected through underground testing. That being the position it is imperative that the proposal of the Western nuclear Powers contained in their second draft treaty to ban nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, in outer space and underwater should have added to it a measure which would meet the expectation that all tests will cease. It is clear that without such a measure the

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draft treaty banning nuclear weapon tests in only three environments which has been submitted to us cannot constitute a satisfactory solution of the problem. In the first place, the arms race would not be stopped; secondly, the perfecting of nuclear weapons would go on and thus the danger of a nuclear war would be perpetuated and aggravated; and, thirdly, the dissemination of nuclear weapons among an increasing number of States would actually be encouraged.

In effect, by submitting the two draft treaties on 27 August the delegations of the United States and the United Kingdom have continued to follow the line of fighting the eight-nation memorandum. First they tried the method of discrediting by a torrent of questions the compromise proposal put forward by the non-aligned nations. Then there were endeavours to distort that compromise proposal so as to make it appear identical in substance with the old United States proposals. Finally there came the attempt to substitute the old Western proposals for the memorandum as the basis for negotiations -- and indeed since the two draft treaties were submitted the Western delegations have acted as though the eight-nation memorandum no longer existed as a basis for negotiations.

However, we note that during the present debate the importance of the memorandum as the basis for negotiations has been forcefully underlined by the majority of the representatives here assembled. The representative of the United Arab Republic Mr. Hassan said:

"... to date the eight Power memorandum remains the best, the most practical and the fairest basis for a test ban settlement which might safeguard the national security as well as the national prestige of all the parties concerned." (ENDC/PV.70, p.23)

The representative of Brazil, Mr. Castro, after stating that

"We do not think that any kind of testing should be permitted or condoned; we are for the immediate cessation of all tests." (ENDC/PV.77, p. 24),

-- a statement to which I subscribe with both hands -- told us the following:

"My delegation firmly believes that the eight-nation joint memorandum is still the best available document to help negotiations on a comprehensive test ban." (ibid.)

Finally, the representative of Sweden, Mr. Edberg said:

"We still feel that it provides not only a realistic but probably the only possible bridge for a compromise." (ibid. p. 30)

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I cannot conclude these observations, which I felt it was my duty to make, without drawing the Committee's attention to the concept embodied in the so-called new proposals of the United States and the United Kingdom Governments. It is somewhat the concept of a dealer who thinks he holds a monopoly on a certain item and is prepared to sell it at an exclusive price believing that he can impose it. In that connexion I think relevant what the representative of Canada, Mr. Burns, said on 27 August:

"It would seem to me that the Soviet Union should be prepared to pay -- if it wishes underground testing to be excluded -- the small price of agreeing to a small number of neutral investigations on the spot ..." (ENDC/PV.75,p.52)

It is not only the concept of Mr. Burns; generally speaking it is the concept of the Western Powers. As if to prove that, the representative of the United States, Mr. Stelle said, two days later:

"If the Soviet Union will not accept a partial treaty .. but with no provisions with regard to underground testing, then it has a simple choice. It can pay the small price of a few on-site inspections a year ..." (ENDC/PV.76,p.49)

The Western delegations seem to forget that the United States ceased years ago to hold a monopoly in that field and that all the nuclear Powers must make equal efforts in order to reach agreement without asking for unilateral advantages.

That is an issue whose settlement is desired by the whole of mankind wanting to eliminate the danger of nuclear war. When someone poses conditions and asks for prices which he knows to be unacceptable it means that he is not really interested in reaching agreement but is after some other thing. What are the real intentions of the United States and United Kingdom Governments? I think that that point is clarified in an article published by the United States News and World Report of 20 August 1962, in which on page 20, under the significant title, "Arms Race Speeds Up; The Meaning", we read:

"After Russia's current tests the United States will be faced with the issue of testing again. Tests will be held if Russia's new tests suggest important advances by her. Talks about a test ban are expected to go on all the while."

That was corroborated by the representative of the United States, Mr. Dean, when he said on 28 August:

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"Our policy is and always has been a policy of restraint. But we must of course, evaluate the current series of Soviet tests in the atmosphere when and if they are concluded." (ENDC/SC.I/PV.24, p.14)

So here seems to be the truth. The United States, which has not yet finished the series of tests begun on 26 April, wants to ensure a free hand for undertaking new tests. That is why it maintains old unacceptable conditions meant to block the way to an agreement on banning nuclear weapons tests in all environments.

However, the Romanian delegation notes that there are still objective possibilities for reaching an agreement on the conclusion of a treaty banning nuclear tests in all environments. There also exists the objective possibility of obtaining, pending the conclusion of such a treaty, an agreement on cessation, until the date of the conclusion of a treaty, of all nuclear weapons tests. In order to achieve that it is necessary only that the Governments of the United States and the United Kingdom should listen to the voice of reason and to the desire of all people to remove as soon as possible that big danger to our lives as well as to those of the generations to come. The Romanian delegation does not abandon the hope that the Western Governments will at last listen to the voice of reason.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland) (translation from French): We have been sitting for three hours and there are still two speakers on the list. We can either continue the meeting or hold over the discussion until Wednesday morning, 5 September. It goes without saying that I am entirely in the hands of the Committee.

Mr. GODBER (United Kingdom): I believe my name was the next on the list, so perhaps it is appropriate that I should give my response to your suggestion, Mr. Chairman. It had occurred to me in looking round at my colleagues that in fact their appetite for words was not as keen as it had been at ten o'clock this morning. That being so, I should be perfectly happy to defer my speech until a future occasion when I feel sure they will all be more anxious to hear it than they are at this particular moment of time.

Mr. TARABANOV (Bulgaria) (translation from French): I think that our United Kingdom colleague has summed up the position correctly. It would perhaps be best, while keeping the order of inscription, to put off the statements until Wednesday.

Mr. PADILLA NERVO (Mexico): My name also is in the list. I would support the proposal made by the representative of the United Kingdom and the representative of Bulgaria. I think that if we remained here now it would take us until eight o'clock, and I believe that everybody is in need of a rest after the two meetings today. Therefore I also would prefer that we should adjourn now and continue next Wednesday.

The CHAIRMAN (Poland) (translation from French): The Mexican representative's name was not put on the list of speakers because I was told that he had given up his intention of speaking. That is why I said that there were still two more speakers down to speak at today's meeting.

Since the delegations concerned agree - and I think the other delegations do too - we can adjourn our discussion until Wednesday morning, 5 September.

If there are no further remarks, I shall take it that is agreed.

The Conference decided to issue the following communique:

"The Conference of the Eighteen Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its seventy-eighth and seventy-ninth plenary meetings in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Mr. Naszkowski, Vice-Minister for Foreign Affairs and representative of Poland.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Burma, Czechoslovakia, Canada, Nigeria, India, Ethiopia, Brazil, the United States, the Soviet Union and Romania.

"The next plenary meeting of the Conference will be held on Wednesday, 5 September 1962, at 10 a.m."

The meeting rose at 6.40 p.m.